Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Purposes & Principles:
Article 1 of this chapter brings
out, inter alia, the purposes of the United Nations to maintain international
peace and security, and to develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.
Referendum:
Chamber’s Twentieth Century
Dictionary 1966 defines the word thus:
The principle or practice of
submitting a question directly to the vote of the entire electorate.
The same dictionary defines
plebiscite:
A direct vote of the whole nation
or of a people of a district on a special point; an ascertaining of general
opinion on any matter, as by inviting postcards.
For reasons of economic
subsistence, a modern electorate is deemed to include persons qualified as
resident in the area covered by an election or opinion-poll, and resident in
the same area but not ordinarily resident, such as members of the armed
services, employees of the United Nations, and persons temporarily living
abroad for reasons of livelihood. With modern communication the voting slips
are made to reach the overseas voters but, in their absence, the ability to
journey home to vote is a prerequisite.
When Indo-Portuguese relations
were peaceful:
A little known piece of recorded
information is that in 1947 a Portuguese-nominated and sponsored Goan
delegation of Goa and Bombay visited Rome and Lisbon for the canonization of
St. John de Brito on June 22, 1947. In the delegation was Professor Aloysius
Soares, a Goan educationist – later knighted by the Holy See – of Bombay who –
while in Lisbon – had broached the subject of Goa’s future with the Portuguese
Overseas Minister, Captain Teófilo Duarte and then with Prime Minister Dr.
Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. He told both dignitaries that a free India would
never tolerate a foreign pocket on its coastline. To the former, Prof. Soares
handed over a draft constitution to make Goa autonomous and then hand it over
to India (something done in Macau but with 15 years of talks and preparatory
actions). Prof. Soares had an independent meeting with Dr. Salazar on the
future of Goa and told him about the realities of Goan emigration from Goa. On
the basis of that talk Dr. Salazar sent a confidant for a first-hand report on
the realities of the situation in Goa, Dr. Socrates da Costa, member of the
Portuguese National Assembly. When Dr. Socrates da Costa visited Bombay in 1953
he gave Prof. Soares a feed back on those talks with Dr. Salazar in these words:
“I receive,” Salazar said, “many resolutions and telegrams of loyalty from Goa.
But that professor who came from Bombay gave us quite a different idea. I want
to know the truth. If the Goans, owing to nationalist feelings or economic
reasons, wish to join India voluntarily, I am not going to stand in their way.
But if coercion is used to force them against their will, I shall stand by them
and support them to the limit.” Prof. Soares has added that “what that envoy
has reported is not known to me, but Salazar’s attitude later grew rigid to a
degree.”
Some votaries of referendum in
foresight or hindsight of the conquest of Portuguese India:
This includes the suggestion of
independence, as well, for the Portuguese State of India.
• In 1956, Portuguese ambassador
to France, Marcello Mathias, along with Portuguese Prime Minister António de
Oliveira Salazar, argued in favour of a referendum in Goa to determine its
future. This proposal was however rejected by the ministers for defence and
foreign affairs.
• General Humberto Delgado,
candidate to the Presidency of the (Portuguese) Republic, defended a plebiscite
for the resolution of the case of the State of India (as the Portuguese State
of India was called);
• Colonel Carlos Alexandre de
Moraes has written in the conclusion of his memorable book that “Thus, in a
rising accumulation of the tragic errors committed at all levels of the Central
Administration and from the grave deficiencies of the concerned military
superiors, of the Government of the State of India and of the local command,
was closed sadly the glorious cycle of the presence of Portugal in the
Hindustan lands, to which deeds and spiritual values bound us of which very
legitimately we were proud. And sadly – we underscored – because its term,
without glory for the conquered, was sealed by bitterness of the rout, for the
conquered and by the irreparable loss of the independence of the territories of
and to which the populations had full right.”
• General Ramalho Eanes, former
President of the Republic, when interviewed by José Pedro Castanheira: “Goa met
all the conditions because we had made something there which we had not managed
to make anywhere else (I only realized this later). A new culture had been
created which was not ours but it wasn’t Indian either. Goa had its own
cultural personality. Recently, Professor Fausto Quadros compared Goa to Timor;
I think he is somewhat right. Goa could have been not the Portuguese State of
India but the State of Goa (independent)…….Salazar, after the Second World War,
had all the conditions met to grant independence to Goa.”
The ground realities:
General Carlos de Azeredo, a
monarchist by persuasion, who had two military stints in Goa, was captured at the
time of the Indian conquest of December 18-19, 1961, and had accompanied
Foreign Minister Mario Soares to Goa and Delhi in December 1974, has stated in
an interview :
“The neighbouring immense Union
of India is a volcano of nationalistic fervour. Independent of England since
1947, even before independence, already its principal directors had proclaimed
the integration of the territories of Estado Português da Índia: Goa Damão and
Diu. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the great Indian Nation, would be the first
to declare that Goa could not remain separate. This would be a political
fixation of the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who, in 1950, formally
reclaimed the territories administered by Portugal, proposing the opening of
negotiations. The government presided over by Oliveira Salazar refuses, with
the argument that Goa and the other territories form part of the whole nation.
In Goa, Damão and Diu, the manifestations of civil disobedience or in favour of
right to autonomy have prison, deportation or censorship as a reply. Many
Goans, be they Catholics or Hindus, are compelled to exile.
In a dialogue of the deaf, a new
tactic is followed: that of pressure through economic blockades and recourse to
the famous “satyagrahis,” who peacefully invade Portuguese territories………….”
Going back to the independence of
the British named “Empire of India” which comprised directly ruled presidencies
and provinces and a suzerainty over 562 princely states, of roughly three
categories according to degrees of self-government, political expediency mixed
with religious chauvinism saw the emergence on August 15, 1947 of the Dominions
(continuing allegiance to the British Crown) of India and Pakistan with options
to each of the 562 states to either remain independent or accede to India or
Pakistan. India lost no time in mopping up operations where the princely states
were concerned. The recalcitrant Nizam’s Dominions of Hyderabad was militarily
attacked in September 1948 and compelled to accede to India and a similar threat,
held out to the last surviving princely state of Manipur, brought about its
capitulation a year later. On November 1, 1956 the princely states ceased to
exist. In 1975, the northern Protectorate of Sikkim was placed under Indian
siege through a populist revolt of the majority Nepalese immigrant population,
and was integrated into the Indian Union in terms of the 1950 Constitution.
The Indian Magna Carta:
Soon after Indian Independence,
August 15, 1947, the All India Congress Party passed its landmark resolution on
the Portuguese and French possessions in India at its yearly session in Jaipur
on December 18, 1948 - called the Jaipur Resolution - that:
With the establishment of
independence in India, the continued existence of any foreign possession in
India becomes anomalous and opposed to the conception of India’s unity and
freedom. Therefore it has become necessary for these possessions to be
politically incorporated with India, and no other solution can be stable or
lasting or in conformity with the will of the people. The Congress trusts that
this change will be brought about soon by peaceful methods and the friendly
cooperation of the Governments concerned.
. This resolution of his
political party brought to an inglorious end what the biographer and former
secretary of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has recorded :
“Nehru in his early days in
office was inexperienced in statecraft and offered plebicites all round – in
Kashmir, in the French and Portuguese possessions in India.”
Thus began the transition from an
olive-branch politics to an aggressive sabre-rattling against the presence of
Portugal and France on the Indian Peninsula.
The case of French India:
The French Union, which lasted
from 1946 to 1956, comprised of metropolitan France which consisted of overseas
departments, and overseas territories (the French settlements in India fell in
this category), as well as of associated states and associated
territories.
The French areas concerned in
negotiations between New Delhi and Paris were remnants of the former French
empire in India. These settlements – Pondichéry, Chandernagore, Yanaon, Karikal
and Mahé – totaled only 196 square miles. All of them were coastal locations
except Chandernagore. The total population of French India in 1948 was 332,045,
less than 2,000 of whom were European French.
French – India constitution
dichotomy:
All the settlements of French
India had elected municipal councils. French India was part of the French Union
and sent one representative to the Assembly of the French Union, two to the
Council of the Republic, and one to the National Assembly in Paris. In view of
possible territorial changes in French India, Article 27 of the 1946 French
Constitution was significant. According to this article, treaties “that involve
the cession, exchange or addition of territories shall not become final until
they have been ratified by a legislative act” and “no cession, or exchange and
no addition of territory shall be valid without the consent of the population
concerned.”
On the other hand the
Constitution of India reads, in its opening, the following provisions:
PART I: THE UNION AND ITS
TERRITORY: 1. (1) India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. (2) The
States and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the First Schedule.
(3) The territory of India shall comprise: (a) the territories of the States;
(b) the Union territories specified in the First Schedule; and (c) such other
territories as may be acquired.
2. Parliament may by law admit
into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms and conditions as it
thinks fit.
Indian constitutional provisions
for accretion of territory provide for neither the manner in which territory
may be acquired nor for popular consultation, by way of a referendum, as is
provided for in the French constitution. And so while the French constitution
is impeccable in regard to world conscience on the addition to or separation of
populations from the French constitutional domain, the Indian constitution
presents a blank thereat as the reasons and mode of acquisition of territories
are not specified in Article 1(3)(c) of its Constitution.
Although France was not initially
keen to commit herself to a French Indian referendum, not long after India’s
own independence she did, in a joint declaration (on August 28, 1947) declare
willingness to solve differences with India in an amicable manner. It was
agreed that the will of the people would have to be taken into account.
Negotiations between the French
and Indian governments over the future of French India have (since) been
prolonged and often stormy. After discussions between the two governments in
New Delhi, a declaration was made in the National Assembly of France on June 8,
1948 setting forth the principles along which the peoples of French India would
determine their future. The declaration stated that “Their decision will be
taken by means of sincere and free consultation………The results of this
consultation will hold good for each of the five establishments separately and
not globally for the whole.”
The French enclave of
Chandernagore, with its predominantly Bengali population, went through the
gamut of a referendum which was held on June 19, 1949, with 7,473 votes in
favour of India and 114 against. The de-facto transfer by France to India was
on May 2, 1950 and the de-jure transfer, on June 9, 1952. On November 2, 1954
Chandernagore was merged into West Bengal.
The France India imbroglio:
India initiated a two-pronged
strategy viv-à-vis the other French establishments.
There was bilateral negotiation
with the French government through the latter’s diplomatic mission in New
Delhi; and there was also operation on the ground through India’s consular
mission in Pondichéry.
India’s consul-general could and
did become a significant prompt for local anti-French political activity.
Indeed, it is the very astuteness and effectiveness of India’s last
consul-general in Pondichéry, Kewal Singh, that raised doubts about the
spontaneity and homegrown commitment of the merger movement.
The struggle for merger was not
without its share of bloodshed, detentions, violence, and assassinations.
India’s “non-violent” campaign did not preclude the massing of troops, the
placing of embargoes, the setting up of blockades, and the creation of a cordon
sanitaire. Nor did France allow pro-merger activists to proceed unimpeded;
indeed, the French were not above subverting democratic principles and
procedures in order to stifle dissent.
Political and merger vigilantism
in Pondichéry, scuttling of referendum:
Unlike Portuguese India where
munipical councilors were elected on basis of education, qualifications and
merit and the higher echelons of representative governance belonged to the official
União Nacional party which made political factionalism non-existent in
Portuguese India, France had a liberal multi-tired democracy which was not
immune to external pressures.
At the time of India’s
independence, political life in Pondichéry was dominated by the French India
Socialist party (FISP) which advocated unequivocal attachment to France. In the
build-up to Indian independence a number of local political groups began to
crystallize with a view to changing the political status of French India.
On the issue of a referendum,
this is how Professor William F.S. Miles summarizes the Indian scuttling of it
in the remaining four French settlements;
Whether or not the people of
French India would have the opportunity to decide for themselves, the question
of merger was a major sticking point between the French and Indian governments.
It was a demand that seesawed between the two sides and depended on the
strategic value which each country saw in it. In the end, however, it was India
that refused to allow a popular referendum on merger, relegating forever the
populations’ true wishes to the realm of speculation and hypothesis.
With negotiations dragging, a
frustrated Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared on October 9, 1952: “There
is an end to the plebiscite business now.”
Nehru’s unilateral renunciation
of a referendum warrants some examination. Ostensibly the Indian government
believed that, given the political climate and violence prevailing in the
French territories, no referendum could practically be conducted in a free and
fair way. Ideologically, it took the position that, since these territories
were part of the Indian Motherland, and were populated by Indians, it was
unnecessary – indeed demeaning – even to pose the question of merger. Looming
well over the horizon was the Kashmir issue where Nehru had succumbed to
cabinet pressure to oppose a referendum.
Operation on the ground directly
or through India’s consular mission in Pondichéry:
Kewal Singh, Indian Charge
d’Affaires in Lisbon till the Indian Legation closed there on June 11, 1953,
took charge as Consul General in Pondichéry on December 10, 1953 from Consul
General R.K. Tandon..
Meanwhile, the Indian government
provoked material scarcity and economic hardships which made merger a matter of
survival. When the elected leaders of French India (i.e., those of the French
India Socialist party) reversed their stand in 1954 to support the immediate
merger with India, it was economic pressure, not Indian consciousness, that ultimately
prevailed.
Consul General Kewal Singh, on
the night of April 11, 1954, at a conference at Kanda-mangalam stated that, for
real liberation of colonies one should attack any of the big four French
settlements. The outcome was that Yanaon fell on June 13, 1954:and Mahé, on
June 16, 1954.
On July 30, 1954 France finally
caved in and proposed a de-facto transfer. On November 1, 1954 the French
handed over power to Kewal Singh who became elevated from Consul General of
India to Pondichéry’s first Indian chief executive. The de jure transfer took
place on August 16, 1962, but without the required referendum as required by
Article 27 of the 1946 French constitution. .
United Nations General Assembly
resolutions:
The United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) had been meeting every year from September after electing a new
president at the start of every session. But the session of 1960 was both
significant and ominous. On December 14, 1960 the UN General Assembly passed
Resolution No. 1514 (XV): “Declaration on the granting of independence to
colonial countries and peoples.” After detailing 11 reasons for the said
resolution, the General Assembly wound up its declaration in seven paragraphs
of which the significant and operative one was:
2. All peoples have the right to
self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
The ominous and dichotomous
paragraph below is believed to have been inserted at the intervention of the
Indian delegate:
6. Any attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations.
This paragraph injects the
substance of geography to override humanly the rights of a separate people
allied with a separate – in this case, another European power for four and a
half centuries - only because of territorial contiguity.
However, when the writer of this
article visited the United Nations in New York in September 1969 and examined
the 1969 United Nations Year Book, it was stated therein that “Goa and its
dependencies had been nationally reunited with India.”
The issue of Portuguese India:
Similar undermining of Portuguese
sovereignty, other than the seqestration of Dadrá and Nagar Aveli, through
pressures upon Goan immigrants in Bombay, satyagrahas, suspension of
remittances, and the economic blockade of Portuguese India had failed and, in
the final analysis, a military action was launched against Goa, Damão and Diu
on December 18, 1961
Debate at the United Nations
Security Council:
Under the Presidentship of Mr. O.
Loutfi of the (erstwhile) United Arab Republic (then comprised of Egypt and
Syria) there were present the representatives of the following states as
members of the United Nations Security Council: Ceylon, Chile, China (Taiwan),
Ecuador, France, Liberia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
United States of America.
In response to the letter dated
December 18, 1961 from the Permanent representative of Portugal to the
President of the Security Council (S/5030) the Security Council opened debate
of the representatives of Portugal and India and its other members on the same
day at 03.00 pm. After hearing the Representative of Portugal, Dr. Vasco Vieira
Garin, India’s Representative had the following to state, relative to the
subject of the chapter:
• “Who gave Portugal sovereign
rights over the part of India which it is occupying illegally and by
force?............... Not the people of India.”
• “It is a question of getting
rid of the last vestiges of colonialism in India. This is a matter of faith
with us. Whatever anyone else may think, Charter or no Charter, Council or no
Council, that is our basic faith which we cannot afford to give up at any
cost.”
In the second session of the day
which began at 08.45 pm, the Indian Representative stated, inter alia:
• “Someone raised the question of
self-determination. How can there be self-determination by an Indian in order
to say that he is part of India or self-determination by an African to say that
he is an African, or by a Frenchman to say that he would remain a part of
France?”
India’s focus on “referendum,”
already made manifest in regard to the four French settlements in India, is now
reiterated with vigour in the Security Council debate to demonstrate Indian
recalcitrance on the subject because it considered both French Indians and
Portuguese Indians as part and parcel of the “Indian Motherland.”
Seal on conquest:
From the first general election
in 1952, in the new Republic of India (founded on January 26, 1950), the oath
of allegiance required of a candidate in order to be eligible to stand for
election in a State was:
“I, A.B., having been nominated
as a candidate to fill a seat tin the Legislative Assembly (or Legislative
Council) do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true and
faithful allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established.”
But after India decided to
provide the veneer of democracy to former Portuguese and French India, fearing
that the newly elected legislators would use their position to exercise the
right of self determination, an amendment to the Constitution of India to
include an anti-secession provision was billed in the Indian Parliament in
Delhi on January 18, 1963 and passed as The Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment)
Act, 1963 on October 5, 1963.
The anti-secession provision
reads as follows:
“and that I will uphold the
sovereignty and integrity of India.”
This oath had already been
suffixed with this anti-secession provision and notified in The First Schedule
to The Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 dated May 10, 1963 under which
elections to the state assemblies were held and governments were set up in the
Union Territories of Goa, Daman and Diu and Pondicherry respectively.
The people of the former
Portuguese and French territories in India got bound by allegiance to a
constitution in the framing of which they had played no part, and by an oath
which shackled them for good and all to a nation of which they had never been
part, to legal and administrative systems which were inferior to what had been
enjoyed under the Portuguese and French Flags, and to an officialdom where IAS,
IPS etc. outsiders, who had never been privy to the niceties of European law
and local custom, now lorded over them. Such is now the position on the
fiftieth anniversary of the conquest and subjugation by India of the former
Portuguese State of India with Goa enjoying full statehood within the Union,
and Damão and Diu continuing as a joint Union Territory without a legislature.
Conclusion:
From hindsight, given Delhi’s
ideological “Indian Motherland” obsession and the Jaipur Resolution of December
18, 1948, Professor Aloysius Soares’s proposal of Portuguese autonomy followed
by a transfer to India with that autonomy in place, was the most pragmatic
solution to the issue of the Portuguese settlements, an experiment tried out
with success in Macau except that in the latter, it took 15 years to negotiate
and dovetail Portuguese laws and administrative practices with those of China.
Even here, strictly speaking, a referendum to transfer from one power to
another would be required. On the other hand, referenda have resolved many an
issue of territorial claim, to cite a few: Gibraltar, Bermuda, Reunion, East
Timor, and early this year, South Sudan.
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